Tanska

Conference Announcement and 2nd Call for Papers:

2ND COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE IN EPISTEMOLOGY:
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN
AUGUST 19-20, 2010

We tend to think of liberal democracy as providing the most ethically defensible way to set up a modern society. A separate yet highly relevant issue is whether liberal democracies also are preferable from an epistemological perspective, i.e., from the point of view of promoting true over false belief, knowledge over ignorance, and so on.
The purpose of this conference -- and of the research project that it is part of -- is to investigate the norms, practices, and institutions that determine how belief and knowledge is acquired and transmitted in liberal democracies. Questions to be addressed include but are not limited to the following:

- Under what conditions is free speech a truth-conducive social arrangement?
- When can we trust each others' testimony?
- What is the proper response to disagreement, including disagreements among experts?
- What is the proper role of scientific expertise in democratic decision making?
- How is the need for expertise to be balanced against the desire for adequate representation?
- What are the epistemological properties of social deliberation?

CONFIRMED SPEAKERS
Speakers include David Estlund (Brown), David Christensen (Brown), Jerry Gaus (Arizona), Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg), Rainer Hegselmann (Bayreuth), Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen), Michael Lynch (UConn), and Erik J. Olsson (Lund).

CALL FOR PAPERS
We cordially invite you to submit a 500 word abstract on any topic relevant to the conference theme. Please prepare your abstract for anonymous review. Abstracts should be submitted (as a plain text, MS Word, or PDF file) to cph.epistemology(at)gmail.com no later than April 1, 2010. Decisions regarding acceptance will be made within two weeks.

REGISTRATION
To register, please e-mail kappel(at)hum.ku.dk with your name and affiliation. There will be a registration fee of 200 DKK ($40, or €25) for faculty, and 100 DKK ($20, or €12) for students. There will also be an option to attend the conference dinner on the evening of August 19 at a cost of 400 DKK ($80, or €50). Please indicate in your registration if you wish to attend. All fees are due in full on the first day of the
conference.

ORGANIZERS
The conference is organized by the Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) at the University of Copenhagen as part of the research project, the Epistemology of Liberal Democracy: Truth, Free Speech and Disagreement, conducted with generous support from the Velux Foundation.

WEB PAGE
http://epistemology.ku.dk/
 

Faculty of Theology
University of Copenhagen

NOTICE
1 Post-doc scholarship open at the Centre for Naturalism & Christian Semantics (CNCS).

Subject to the necessary grant, the Centre for Naturalism & Christian Semantics at the Faculty of Theology at the University of Copenhagen gives notice of a Post-doc scholarship.

The scholarship is for two years and is planned to start on 1^st February, 2010. Applications are invited for research on naturalistic challenges to central Christian ideas of God and human nature. Preference will be given to research proposals that evidence a philosophical capacity to investigate scientific and theological explanations of the evolution of human cognition, including ideas of divinity.

Appointment as a post.doc researcher requires academic qualifications at PhD level. Applications must include documentation on the applicant’s education, employment, research contribution, and teaching experience. A complete, numbered list of publications must be included. Up to five publications that the application particularly relies upon should be stated. The applicant cannot require the panel of evaluators to ignore the applicant’s other publications.
The publications cited must be sent with the application. If the panel of evaluators finds it necessary to look at other material, the applicant will be informed and required to send what is requested. If material is enclosed that is the product of group work, the extent and character of the applicant’s share in each text must be made clear in the application.

All material must be sent in four copies.

The appointment and salary will be in accordance with the agreement on state-employed academics in force between the Ministry of Finance and the Danish Confederation of Professional Associations (AC), and the salary will be determined by seniority plus an annual superannuable assistant professor supplement of DKK 45,793.53 (as per 1^st April 2007).

After the deadline for applications, a panel of qualified judges will be established. Applicants will be informed who is on the panel. When the panel has made its decision, every applicant will be sent that part of the evaluation that concerns him or her. Before the faculty (the Dean) can make a decision on the appointment, a meeting must be held with one (or possibly several) of the applicants that the panel has judged to be qualified. At the meeting (or meetings) the faculty will be represented by the Dean, the Chairman of the assessment panel, and the Head of the Centre.

Any questions can be addressed by telephone to Niels Christian Tolvang-Nielsen on (+45) 3532 3605 or to Prof. Niels Henrik Gregersen on (+45) 3532 3681/nhg(a)teol.ku.dk. Information about the Centre is available on www.teol.ku.dk/cncs. Further information on the place of work can be found on the Faculty’s website at http://www.teol.ku.dk/

Applications must have been received by the Faculty of Theology by 12 noon on 1^st December, 2009 marked 211-0044/09-1110.
 
 

COPENHAGEN EPISTEMOLOGY WORKSHOP
University of Copenhagen
October 29

*Schedule*:

10.00-10.30: Coffee

10.30-12.00: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva):
Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise

12.00-13.15: Lunch

13.15-14.45 Matthew S. Liao (Oxford):
Disagreeing with Peers

14.45-15.00: Break

15.00-16.30: Peter Graham (UC Riverside):
Reliability and Entitlement

16.30-16.45: Break

16.45-18.15: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen):
Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions


*Venue*: Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen (Amager), Room
14.2.50

*Registration and enquiries*: There is no registration fee. However, if you would like to attend the workshop—or have any enquiries concerning the event—please contact Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (nikolaj(at)ucla.edu).


*Abstracts*

Speaker: Adam Carter (Edinburgh/Geneva)
Title: Knowledge, Testimony and Philosophical Expertise
Abstract: It is widely thought that one could come to gain knowledge on some scientific matter simply by consulting an expert—namely a scientist. That this is so owes at least in part to the fact that science is a subject matter that admits of expertise; not all scientific opinions are of equal worth. Presumably, (or so we’d like to think), the same holds in the area of philosophy, where likewise (we suppose) not all opinions are of equal worth. But on a given philosophical matter—say the matter of “what constitutes the good life”—can one come to gain the relevant item of knowledge simply by consulting an expert—namely (in this case) by seeking the testimony of a moral philosopher? It doesn’t seem so. At the very least, we’d be inclined to say that one’s inquiry into philosophical questions—unlike one’s inquiry into (for example) scientific questions—could not rightly be said to end at the testimony of an expert. Why exactly is this? A more general tension emerges between three intuitive, but jointly inconsistent claims:

(1) For any subject area S that admits of expertise, one can come to gain knowledge of (at least some) S-questions simply by consulting the testimony of S-experts.

(2) Philosophy is a subject area that admits of expertise.

(3) One can’t come to gain knowledge of philosophical questions simply by consulting the testimony of philosophical ‘experts.’

The aim of my paper will be to resolve this triad of inconsistent claims, and in a way that does not require a denial of philosophical expertise.

Speaker: Matthew S. Liao (Oxford)
Title: Disagreeing with Peers
Abstract: What should you do in a case of disagreement with an epistemic peer? Are you epistemically justified in sticking to your guns or does the mere fact of the peer disagreement require at least some belief revision on your part? In this paper, I argue that one should distinguish between two kinds of peer disagreements: Surface Disagreements and Reflective Disagreements. I first argue that in Surface Disagreements, belief revision is required. But the explanation I offer as to why belief revision is required is, as I shall explain, different from the explanation given in the literature. Next, I argue that in Reflective Disagreements, you can stick to your guns. I first consider and reject what I call the Downgrade View, according to which, you can stick to your guns because you can downgrade the status of your epistemic peer. I then sketch and defend what I call the Set Aside View, according to which, you can stick to your guns because you can set aside the fact that your peer disagrees with you.

Speaker: Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside)
Title: Reliability and Entitlement
Abstract: Reliability theories of epistemic entitlement face two familiar counterexamples: the brain-in-a-vat and clairvoyant powers cases. To avoid these cases, reliability theorists restrict entitlement conferring reliability to reliability in certain circumstances. The BIV’s processes are reliable in C, but clairvoyant powers are not reliable in C. The challenge is to come up with the correct C, to explain why entitlement should turn on reliability in C. By adding a few tools to the reliabilist toolbox, the challenge can be met. By adding the etiological notions of function, normal functioning and normal conditions, we can avoid the cases while explaining why reliability should turn on reliability in normal conditions.

Speaker: Mikkel Gerken (SERG, Copenhagen)
Title: Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions
Abstract: I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions – one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I conceive of a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes of the sort that may function as
premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished distinct from other kinds of presuppositions. Finally, I note some epistemological features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.
 

Inaugural seminar of Nordic Network for German Idealism

 

University of Aarhus, Department of Philosophy

10th of March 2009

Studenternes Hus, Mødelokale 2

 

Hegel's Concept of Spirit

 

9.30 -10.00 Welcome and presentation of Nordic Network for German
Idealism (Anders Moe Rasmussen - University of Aarhus)

 

10.00-11.00 Geist und Erkennen. Anerkennung und rationale
rechtfertigung in Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) (Kenneth
Westphal - University of Kent)

 

11.00-11.15 Coffee Break

 

11.15-12.15 Sociality of Reason: Realism vs. Constructivism (Arto
Laitinen - University of Helsinki)

 

12.15-13.15 Lunch

 

13.15-14.15 Der Begriff der Erfahrung in Hegel's Phänomenologie des
Geistes (Dina Emundts - Humboldt Universität, Berlin)

 

14.15-15.15 Forcing Understanding; Understanding Forces - The Pre-text
of Self-Consciousness in Hegel's Phenomenology (Thomas Schwarz Wentzer
- University of Aarhus)

 

15.15-15.30 Coffee Break

 

15.30-16.30 Geometry of the Spirit (Aleš Bunta - University of
Ljubljana)

 

16.30-          Reception in 'Richard Mortensen stuen'

 

 

The conference and the reception are open for all and free of charge.